Corrupting Charity: Why Government Should Not Fund Faith-Based Charities by Michael D. Tanner
Corrupting Charity
Why Government Should Not Fund
Faith-Based Charities
by Michael Tanner
Michael Tanner is director of Health and Welfare Studies at the Cato Institute and  the author of  The End of Welfare:
Fighting Poverty in a Civil Society.
No. 62
President George W. Bush has proposed
that faith-based charities be made eligible to
receive billions of dollars in federal grants to
provide social services. But doing so risks mix-
ing government and charity in a way that
could undermine the very things that have
made private charity so effective.
Government dollars come with strings
attached and raise serious questions about the
separation of church and state. Charities that
accept government funds could find them-
selves overwhelmed with paperwork and sub-
ject to a host of federal regulations. The poten-
tial for government meddling is tremendous,
and, even if regulatory authority is not abused,
regulation will require a redirection of scarce
resources from charitable activities to admin-
istrative functions. Officials of faith-based
charities may end up spending more time
reading the Federal Register than the Bible.
As they became increasingly dependent on
government money, faith-based charities
could find their missions shifting, their reli-
gious character lost, the very things that made
them so successful destroyed. In the end,
Bush’s proposal may transform private chari-
ties from institutions that change people’s
lives to mere providers of services, little more
than a government program in a clerical collar.
Most important, the whole idea of charity
could become subtly corrupted; the difference
between the welfare state and true charity
could be blurred. 
Charitable giving is at a record high; there
is no need to risk deepening the involvement
of government and religious charity. President
Bush should abandon his proposal and leave
charities to do what they do best.
March 22, 2001
Introduction
Faith-based charities have a long history
of transforming individual lives and helping
to raise people out of poverty and despair.
Indeed, private charities are far more effective
than government welfare programs at fulfill-
ing those roles. They do more with less, and
their success can be seen in tens of thousands
of former addicts, self-sufficient families, and
others who have turned their lives around.
In light of this record of success, it seems
natural for President Bush to want to encour-
age those groups. But, in proposing that the
federal government distribute billions of dol-
lars directly to faith-based charities in the form
of grants and contracts for providing social ser-
vices, he risks mixing government and charity
in a way that could undermine the very things
that have made private charity so effective.
Today, as Table 1 shows, private charities
receive about 30 percent of their funding from
government.1 Religious charities are far less
likely than their secular counterparts to receive
government funds, but government funding
of religious charities is, nevertheless, extensive.
On the front lines are local churches,
mosques, and synagogues. There are more
than 350,000 religious congregations in the
United States today, and a majority are
involved in some type of charitable work.2 A
1998 survey of more than 1,200 religious con-
gregations found that 57 percent were
engaged in social service delivery, most com-
monly food-related projects, housing and
shelter programs, and clothing distribution.
Less frequently cited were health, education,
domestic violence, substance abuse, job train-
ing, and mentoring programs.3 Only about 3
percent of local congregations receive govern-
ment funding for their charitable operations.4
Beyond local churches are large national
organization with sectarian affiliations, such
as Catholic Charities, the Jewish Federations,
Lutheran Social Services, and the Salvation
Army. Those organizations have been recipi-
ents of public funds for many years and have
often set up separate nonsectarian enterprises
for their charitable works. Government
grants provide two-thirds of the funding for
Catholic Charities USA, and the Jewish Board
of Family and Children Services receives 75
percent of its funding from the government.5
Finally, there are organizations that have a
religious orientation but are not affiliated with
any particular group. Some of them are large,
though loosely knit, nationwide organizations,
such as the International Union of Gospel
Missions. Others are small and community
based. There is little reliable information avail-
able on government funding of those groups.
However, general indications are that they
receive more government funding than do
local religious congregations but less than the
nationwide sectarian organizations.
President Bush now calls for “putting the
federal government on the side of [these] vast
armies of compassion” by allow-
ing faith-based charities to
become eligible to receive billions
of dollars in additional federal
grants.6 However, his proposal
raises serious questions about
the separation of church and
state. Moreover, charities that
accept government funds could
find themselves overwhelmed
with paperwork and subject to a
host of federal regulations. As
they became increasingly depen-
dent on government money,
those charities could find their
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Table 1
Who Supports Charity?
Source of Support Precentage
Private payments (dues, fees, etc.) 43.5
Government payments and grants 29.4
Private contributions 17.7
Other 6.8
Endowments 2.6
Source: Joseph P. Shapiro and Jennifer Seter, “Welfare: 
The Myths of Charity,” U.S. News & World Report,
January 16, 1995.
missions shifting and their religious character
lost. The very things that made them so suc-
cessful could be destroyed. Indeed, the whole
idea of charity could become subtly corrupted;
the distinction between the coercive welfare
state and true charity based on voluntary giv-
ing and love of one’s neighbor could be lost.
The Road to Charitable
Choice
Since colonial times, faith-based organiza-
tions in America have played a major role in
providing social services. For most of our his-
tory, those organizations operated without
significant access to government funds.7
Indeed, there was traditionally a suspicion of
government funding of religious institutions,
even charitable ones. James Madison spoke
eloquently for the Founders’ opposition to an
established national church and government
funding of religion: “The appropriation of
funds of the United States for the use and
support of religious societies, [is] contrary to
the article of the Constitution which declares
that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a
religious establishment.’”8
Of course, before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights
was not generally held to apply to state gov-
ernments, and several states had official
churches and provided direct government
funding of religion. The last such provision
was repealed in 1833, with the abolition of
Massachusetts’ general assessment for sup-
port of Christian churches.9
Thereafter, there was little government
funding of religious activities. The federal
government was largely uninvolved in chari-
table activities, so the question of federal
funding of religion seldom arose.1 0 And the
states, spurred in part by the virulently anti-
Catholic Know-Nothing movement of the
1840s, turned actively hostile to religious
funding. In fact, by 1930, 26 states had con-
stitutional prohibitions on government
funding of religious activities.1 1
From the New Deal of the 1930s to the
Great Society of the 1960s and beyond, the
federal government’s involvement in social
welfare increased dramatically. Opportunities
for faith-based charities to receive govern-
ment funding increased correspondingly,
especially after the Johnson and Nixon
administrations began widespread funding
of community organizations in the 1960s.
Still, government agencies struggled to recon-
cile funding of faith-based programs with
concerns about church-state separation.
Most grants came with conditions: a require-
ment that the central religious body form a
separate nonprofit organization to administer
the program and prohibitions on the use of
funds for the purchase or improvement of real
estate that would also be used for sectarian
purposes; on the provision of services in build-
ings that had religious symbols or fixtures; on
the use of funds for training or education for
a religious vocation; and on the use of funds
in religious instruction, worship, prayer, or
other inherently religious activities.12 As late
as 1986, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development proposed a total ban
on grants to churches and other religious
organizations.1 3
Some of the efforts of government to dis-
tance itself from religion were almost comic
in their extremism. According to one perhaps
apocryphal story, reported by columnist
George Will, an official with HUD wrote to
the bishop in charge of the St. Vincent de Paul
Housing Center in San Francisco asking him
to rename the building the Mister Vincent de
Paul Center.1 4 In another case, a city agency
notified the local branch of the Salvation
Army that it would be awarded a contract to
help the homeless, but only on the condition
that the organization remove the word
“Salvation” from its name. Could the organi-
zation, perhaps, be known as some other kind
of army, a government official wondered.1 5
As the failures of government welfare pro-
grams became increasingly apparent, people
began to contrast those failures with the suc-
cess of private charities in general, and faith-
based charities in particular.1 6As a result, there
developed a growing movement to expand
3
As the failures of
government 
welfare programs
became increas-
ingly apparent,
people began to
contrast those
failures with the
success of private
charities in gener-
al, and faith-
based charities in
particular.
the involvement of charities in delivering
social services.
The 1996 welfare reform legislation contains
a provision that allows states to contract with
religious organizations, or to “allow religious
organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or
other forms of disbursement . . . on the same
basis as any other nongovernmental provider
without impairing the religious character of
such organizations, and without diminishing
the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assis-
tance funded under such program.”1 7 That
provision, which became known as Charitable
Choice, applied to four government programs:
(1) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
the successor to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children; (2) Supplementary Security Income;
(3) Medicaid; and (4) food stamps.
Specifically, states could involve faith-
based organizations in the provision of subsi-
dized jobs, on-the-job training, job search and
job readiness assistance, community service
positions, vocational educational training, job
skills training, and general equivalency diplo-
ma programs. Faith-based organizations
could provide meals and run food pantries. In
addition, states could place unmarried minor
mothers and expectant mothers who could
not remain with their parents in maternity
homes, adult-supervised residential care, sec-
ond-chance homes, or other facilities operated
by faith-based organizations. And, last, faith-
based groups could provide abstinence educa-
tion and drug counseling and treatment and
operate health clinics.1 8
Charitable Choice goes much further than
simply making faith-based organizations eli-
gible for government funding. It explicitly
attempts to eliminate many of the restrictions
and conditions previously imposed on gov-
ernment grants to religious organizations.
Specifically, it permits
• provision of government services in
actual houses of worship;
• contractors to display religious “art,
icons, scripture, and other symbols” in
areas where government services are pro-
vided; and
• religious contractors to discriminate
against employees on the basis of their
religious beliefs.
The legislation, however, continues to ban
the use of government funds for “sectarian
worship, instruction, or proselytization.” It
also requires states to provide an alternative
secular provider for any aid recipient who
does not wish to receive services through a
religious institution.
President Bush has sought to build on
Charitable Choice in several ways. He has
established a White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives headed by
Prof. John DiIulio of Princeton University as
well as operational centers for faith-based ini-
tiatives in five federal agencies: the Justice
Department, the Department of Health and
Human services, the Department of Labor, the
Department of Education, and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development.1 9Second,
Bush would expand Charitable Choice to virtu-
ally all government programs. And, third, he
has asked Congress to fund a “compassion
capital fund” to highlight best practices and
provide technical assistance and start-up capi-
tal to promising faith-based programs.2 0
First Amendment
Complications
The phrase “separation of church and
state” does not occur in the U.S. Constitution.
That language comes from a letter that
Thomas Jefferson sent to a group of Baptist
ministers in 1802. However, the Constitution
does say that “Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,” and the courts have long
held that that prohibits government funding
of sectarian religious activities. The law sur-
rounding government funding of secular
activities by otherwise religious organizations
is much less clear.2 1
The general legal rule is known as the
Lemon test, after the 1971 Supreme Court
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 2 Under the
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Lemon test, government may provide aid to a
religious organization, provided that (1) the
government program has a secular purpose,
(2) the aid does not have the primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion, and
(3) the aid does not foster “excessive involve-
ment” between church and state.
Most jurisprudence surrounding govern-
ment funding of religious activities has been
concerned with aid to religious schools.
However, the courts have occasionally
addressed government funding of charitable
activities. The Supreme Court first ruled on the
issue in 1899, in Bradfield v. Roberts, holding
that the District of Columbia could use public
funds to subsidize the construction of a hospi-
tal that was owned by the Catholic Church,
since, despite the religious affiliation of the
ownership and corporate board, there was to
be no direct connection between the hospital
and the church. “The property and its business
were to be managed in its own way, subject to
no visitations, supervision or control by any
ecclesiastical authority whatever.”23
But if purely secular activities could be
funded by the government even when con-
ducted by religious organizations, the ques-
tion of what happens when there is a less dis-
tinct separation of secular and religious has
been more murky. In Raemer v. Board of Public
Works (1976), the Court ruled that no federal
funds could go to an institution that was so
“pervasively sectarian” that secular activities
could not be separated from secular ones.2 4
However, the Court said that, if secular activi-
ties could be separated out, they might be
funded. That was reaffirmed in 1988 in Bowen
v. Kendrick, in which the Court ruled that gov-
ernment may fund social service agencies
with religious ties, again provided that those
agencies are not “pervasively sectarian.”25 The
Court failed to define “pervasively sectarian,”
but a clue may be found in the earlier case of
Hunt v. McNair, in which the Court conclud-
ed, “Aid may normally be thought to have a
primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mis-
sion or when it funds a specifically religious
activity in an otherwise substantially secular
setting.”2 6 This has been generally taken to
mean that such activities as prayer, Bible
study, and proselytizing may not be conduct-
ed with government funds, but the provision
of social services—food, clothing, shelter, edu-
cation, counseling—may be.
Given the unsettled state of the law and the
vagueness of terms such as “pervasively sectar-
ian” and “excessive involvement,” government
grants to faith-based charities are an open invi-
tation to litigation. Diana Etendi, an analyst
with the Welfare Policy Center at the Hudson
Institute, points out the many ambiguities: “If
the pastor of a church, where a new govern-
ment job readiness class is starting, stops by to
welcome the new group of job seeking welfare
recipients and offers a prayer on their behalf, is
that sectarian worship? If God or a biblical
principle is mentioned during the course of
counseling, is that sectarian instruction? If a
client suffering a bitter divorce is invited to
attend one of the church’s regular support
groups, is that proselytizing?”27
There are also issues raised about the fun-
giblity of money provided to religious chari-
ties. If faith-based organizations are able to
use federal funds for their “secular” charitable
activities, money that they had previously
used for those activities will be freed to be
used for their religious activities. In a real
sense, the effect would be the same as that of
the federal government’s directly funding the
religious activities, what the Supreme Court
has called “a legalistic minuet.”2 8 In fact, this
is the logic that President Bush used in deny-
ing government funds to organizations that
provide abortion counseling overseas.2 9
While critics of Charitable Choice point to the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
supporters cite the Free Exercise Clause, argu-
ing that government should not discriminate
against faith-based organizations in awarding
government grants and contracts.30 DiIulio
calls it “leveling the playing field.” He says that
the Bush initiative would simply “end discrim-
ination against religious providers” and allow
“religious organizations that provide social
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services [to] compete for support on the same
basis as other non-governmental providers of
these services.”3 1
Supporters of Charitable Choice are in
essence making an equal protection claim,
and theirs is not a trivial argument. When the
government decides to issue a contract or
grant, all applicants who meet the criteria for
providing that service should be allowed to
compete on an equal basis. The government
should not be able to refuse to give a grant to
an otherwise qualified organization simply
because it is faith based.
The 1995 case of Rosenberger v. Rector and
the Visitors of the University of Virginia provides a
useful parallel. In that case, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the University of Virginia,
having decided to subsidize a wide variety of
student publications, could not refuse to
subsidize a Christian publication that other-
wise met university criteria.32
However, the equal protection argument
would seem to fall short on two grounds.
First, before the adoption of Charitable
Choice, faith-based organizations were not
categorically barred from receiving federal
funds. Rather, restrictions on the receipt of
those funds forced the organizations to
strictly segregate their religious and secular
functions. It seems clear that government
can impose conditions for the receipt of its
funds, although the degree to which the gov-
ernment may restrict a recipient’s exercise of
otherwise protected constitutional rights is
an area of highly unsettled law.3 3 For exam-
ple, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme
Court struck down a prohibition on abor-
tion counseling by agencies receiving federal
family planning funds.34 On the other hand,
the Court has upheld the imposition of gov-
ernment “decency standards” on artists
receiving grants from the National
Endowment for the Arts.3 5
Second, there is the question of whether
supporters of Charitable Choice actually
intend for federal grants and contracts to be
awarded on a strictly neutral basis. Although
President Bush has been careful to insist that
faith-based initiatives will be funded without
regard to denomination, recent history pro-
vides ample cause for concern. For example,
many observers believe that the Nation of
Islam is one of the most effective organiza-
tions in addressing substance abuse and
criminal behavior. Yet, when it was revealed
in 1995 that the Nation of Islam had received
contracts from HUD to provide security in
public housing projects, there was an uproar
in Congress. The organization’s history of
anti-Semitism and discrimination against
whites disqualified it from receiving federal
contracts, critics claimed.3 6
During the 2000 presidential election
campaign, then-candidate Bush was asked if
he would be willing to provide public funds
to the Nation of Islam. He replied, “I don’t
see how we can allow public dollars to fund
programs where spite and hate is the core of
the message.”37 Of course, the meaning of
“hate” is subjective. Some observers have
accused Catholics and evangelical churches
of preaching hatred of gays and Jews.
There have been other attempts by
Congress to bar religious groups that are out
of the mainstream from public funds and
facilities. For example, Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.)
has called for prohibiting Wiccans from con-
ducting religious services on U.S. military
bases.38 One wonders what Barr’s reaction
would be if a Wiccan group were given a
grant to provide social services.
The Regulatory Burden
Regardless of how First Amendment ques-
tions are ultimately decided, there are ample
reasons to question the wisdom of Charitable
Choice. Indeed, while most discussions of the
separation of church and state see it as a way
to protect government from religion, Yale law
professor Steven Carter notes, “It also protects
religion from government.”3 9
Government standards and excessive reg-
ulation intended to ensure accountability
and quality care inevitably come attached to
government grants and contracts. Those
regulations take two forms. First, there are
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regulations, most of which are designed to
avoid church-state entanglements, that are
specifically attached to the law or policy. For
example, the 1996 Charitable Choice provi-
sion specifies that government funds may not
be used for “sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.”40 Likewise, while Bush pro-
poses no specific legislative language, he has
said that no government funds would be
used “for proselytizing or other inherently
religious activities.”41
Stephen Burger, executive director of the
International Union of Gospel Missions,
points out the difficulty of defining what
terms like “proselytizing” mean and warns,
“As well intentioned as Congress is in passing
[Charitable Choice], it will be the govern-
ment bureaucrats and civil-libertarian
lawyers who enforce it.”42 Burger and others
believe that the burden will be on charities to
prove that the funds they receive are being
correctly used. The Charitable Choice legisla-
tion contains provisions requiring charities
that receive funds to submit to government
audits.4 3As a result, the government will have
the right to snoop through a church’s books.  
Unfortunately, as Melissa Rogers of the
American Baptist Convention notes, the regu-
latory language of the statute is “just the tip of
the regulatory iceberg.”44 It has generally been
understood that acceptance of government
funds subjects an organization to a wide range
of federal regulations, chief among them fed-
eral civil rights laws. According to the 1988
Civil Rights Restoration Act, a private organi-
zation “will be covered by [federal nondis-
crimination laws] in its entirety, if it receives
federal financial assistance which is extended
to it as a whole.” Chief among those are Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
natural origin), section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (barring discrimination on
the basis of handicap), the Age Discrimination
Act, and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 (prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex and visual impairment
in educational institutions and programs.)
The Civil Rights Restoration Act does
specify that the anti-discrimination laws will
apply only to “the geographically separate
plant or facility which receives the federal
funds,” but the legislative history makes it
clear that a geographically separate facility
refers to “facilities located in different locali-
ties and regions,” not facilities that are part
of a complex or proximate to each other in
the same city.4 5Therefore, depending on how
the courts or government agencies interpret
the laws, the regulations could go well
beyond the program receiving government
funds and subject the entire church or orga-
nization to government oversight. Richard
Hammar, author of Pastor, Church and Law,
suggests that “in most cases, church pro-
grams and activities are conducted in the
church facility itself, not in a geographically
separate facility. In such cases, [government
regulation] will apply to the entire church
and all of its programs and activities.”4 6
The problem is not with a prohibition on
discrimination (although if anti-discrimina-
tion language is extended to such areas as
sexual orientation and religion, conflicts
with church doctrine could very likely occur)
but with the extensive compliance costs.
For example, under federal anti-discrimi-
nation statutes, organizations must do the
following:
• “Keep such records and submit to the
responsible Department official . . .
timely, complete, and accurate compli-
ance reports at such times, and in such
form, and containing such information
as the responsible Department official
may determine to be necessary to enable
him to ascertain whether the recipient
has complied or is complying with [the
regulation].” Recipients are specifically
required to maintain “racial and ethnic
data, showing the extent to which mem-
bers of minority groups are beneficiaries
of and participants in federally-assisted
programs.”47 
• “Make available to participants, benefi-
ciaries, and other interested persons, such
information regarding the provisions of
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[federal regulations] and its applicability
to the program for which the recipient
receives federal financial assistance.”4 8
• “Permit access by federal government
officials to its ‘books, records, accounts,
and other sources of information and its
facilities as may be pertinent to ascertain
compliance.’”4 9
Many large charities have avoided the
worst of those regulatory intrusions by set-
ting up separate, virtually secular, arms of
their organizations to handle social services.
But that is not a tactic readily available to the
small neighborhood churches that are
among the most effective. The average
church in the United States has a congrega-
tion of only 75 members. Fewer than 1 per-
cent of churches have congregations of more
than 900, and fewer than 10 percent have
congregations exceeding 250 people. The
average annual church budget is only
$55,000.50 Faith-based groups not associated
with specific churches are also quite small,
with budgets averaging around $120,000
annually. On average, those groups have only
two full-time and two part-time employees.5 1
For smaller churches and organizations,
compliance costs will be a terrible burden. As
Michael Horowitz, senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute, puts it, the leaders of those
organizations are likely to end up spending
more time reading the Federal Register than
the Bible.5 2
Civil rights issues may be further extended
because the courts have held that accepting
government money can transform an organi-
zation from a private association into a “state
actor,” bringing the Fourteenth Amendment
into play and imposing equal protection and
due process obligations, which can frequently
conflict with church doctrines.5 3For example,
the courts have held that a religious foster
home that receives substantial state funding
may not prohibit foster children under its con-
trol from having access to contraceptives.5 4
And, although Charitable Choice legislation
contains language exempting faith-based
organizations from civil rights prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of religion,
the courts have said that accepting state funds
can subject a church’s hiring practices to
scrutiny. In one case, the Salvation Army was
prohibited from discharging an employee who
was a Wiccan because the employee’s position
was largely paid for by public funds.5 5
Whether the exemption contained in
Charitable Choice will hold up in the face of
litigation is questionable.
Additional due process regulations may
give recipients the right to hearings, appeals,
and legal challenges if their services are ter-
minated.5 6 Thus, a homeless shelter that
wishes to evict a client for, say, use of drugs
or possessing a weapon, may not be able to
do so without extensive administrative and
legal proceedings.5 7
Beyond civil rights issues, there is a host of
labor, safety, licensing, staff training, and
other regulations that come into play once a
charity accepts public funds. For example,
contractors may be required to pay prevailing
union wages.58 And, because many federal
funds are routed through state agencies, state
regulations may also apply. Those can be as
detailed and idiosyncratic as instructions on
night-light placement and window washing.5 9
States may also require that charitable workers
and providers have specific credentials, for
example, that child-care workers or substance
abuse councilors meet certain educational
requirements. Missouri and South Carolina
exempt church-run child-care facilities from
most state child-care regulations, such as
staffing level requirements and educational
certification of child-care workers. However, in
both states, that exemption does not apply if
the “facility receives any state or federal funds
for providing for children.”6 0
Even the process of applying for federal
funds can be costly and time-consuming,
requiring detailed knowledge of the federal
proposal process. Applications can run to
dozens, even hundreds, of pages and require
extensive supporting documentation. That,
of course, gives an advantage in the competi-
tion for funding to large, established charities
over the smaller, local organizations that are
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arguably the more effective. At the very least,
it represents one more diversion of resources
from actually providing services to people.
Mission Creep
Even charities that have the best of inten-
tions will be tempted to subtly shift the
emphasis of their missions to comply with
the grant criteria. Some faith-based charities
may become increasingly secular in orienta-
tion; others may simply adopt new missions
and services that distract from the church’s
original goal. It is one thing for a church to
open a soup kitchen because its congregation
feels God has called on them to do so. It is
another to open that kitchen because some-
one dangles grant money in front of you.
The first of those two forms of mission
creep, secularization, poses the clearest and
most obvious threat to the nature of faith-
based charities. Facing the threat of litigation
or the loss of federal funding if they violate the
First Amendment, many charities choose to
err on the side of caution, virtually eliminating
any religious component from their services.
Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) tells of the expe-
rience of a young priest who applied for a posi-
tion as a counselor at a clinic sponsored by
Catholic Charities. During his interview, he was
asked about the advice he would provide under
a number of scenarios involving such cases as a
woman seeking an abortion, a man involved in
a homosexual relationship, and a couple about
to divorce. In each case, the priest provided an
answer based on Catholic doctrine. As a result,
he was not hired for the position. When he
asked why, he was told bluntly, “We get govern-
ment funds, so we are not Catholic.”61
Similarly, Joe Loconte, William E. Simon
Fellow in Religion and a Free Society at the
Heritage Foundation, relates how the St.
Francis House, a homeless shelter in Boston,
once staffed largely by Franciscan brothers
and nuns, now avoids hiring “overtly religious
people.” The St. Francis House receives 52
percent of its budget from state contracts.6 2
But why should faith-based charities
eschew proselytizing and explicitly religious
functions? There is a reason for the “faith” in
“faith-based charities.” Those organizations
believe that helping people requires more than
simply food or a bed. It requires addressing
deeper spiritual needs. It is, ultimately, about
God. Yet, in the end, Bush’s proposal may
transform faith-based charities from institu-
tions that change people’s lives into mere
providers of services.
Amy Sheridan, a social policy analyst with
the Hudson Institute, has studied faith-based
charities and found that “the most effective
groups challenge those who embrace faith to
live out its moral implications in every signifi-
cant area of their lives, from breaking drug or
alcohol addiction and repairing family rela-
tionships to recommitting themselves to the
value of honest work.” But Sheridan expresses
concern that government social service con-
tracts are not concerned with such outcomes.
They measure success not by whether a person
has changed his life or embraced God but by
“the number of meals served, beds available, or
checks cashed.”6 3
Stephen Monsma, chairman of the Social
Sciences Division at Pepperdine University,
examined 766 religious nonprofit groups and
concluded that there was an inverse relation-
ship between religious practices and public
funding. Grading the organizations on 15
indicative religious practices—such as having
religious pictures or symbols in facilities, say-
ing prayers at meals, hiring in accordance
with religious orientation, and “encouraging
religious commitment by clients”—Monsma
found that 44 percent of the organizations
scoring lowest on the religious practices scale
received a high percentage of their annual
budget from public funds. Only 28 percent of
the organizations with the highest religious
practice scores received significant amounts
of government funding.64
The second form of mission creep is subtler
but can also seriously distort a charity’s pur-
pose. In the chase for government funding,
charities may adapt their programs to the fed-
eral grant process rather than to the needs of
their clients. Jacquelin Triston of the Salvation
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Army puts it this way: “If you can’t do it the
way you want, then you’ll take your program
and fit it into whatever they’ll give you money
for.”65 As a result, charities may find them-
selves taking on tasks that have little to do
with their original mission or for which they
are untrained or ill equipped.
For example, Massachusetts subsidizes a
large proportion of the charitable work under-
taken by Catholic Charities in that state. In the
mid-1990s the state began to shift its funding
priorities from other social services to sub-
stance abuse. As state funding shifted, so did
the programs offered by Catholic Charities.
Other programs, such as thrift shops, child-
care programs, and soup kitchens have been
closed and alcohol and drug treatment pro-
grams opened. Today, the Massachusetts
office of Catholic Charities spends 80 percent
of its funds on substance abuse programs that
actually serve only a quarter of its clients.6 6
That sort of change in direction can occur
even within small individual programs. Many
government grants are highly prescriptive in
the way they require government funds to be
spent. For example, a government grant for
substance abuse treatment may require that a
specific percentage be spent on prevention,
another amount on HIV, another amount on
pregnant women, a certain percentage on
overhead, and so on.6 7Charities attempting to
meet all the grant conditions can find them-
selves completely redesigning their programs.
As a result, programs that were once very suc-
cessful can become unrecognizable.
Stanley Carlson-Thies, director of social pol-
icy studies at the Center for Public Justice, refers
to this mission creep as “vendorism,” a process
whereby government grants end up directing
the activities of private charities, changing their
direction and turning them into mere “ven-
dors” of government services—government pro-
grams wearing clerical collars.68
Putting Charity on the Dole
There is an even more profound threat to
the identity and mission of faith-based char-
ities. If the history of welfare teaches us any-
thing, it is that government money is as
addictive as any narcotic. “It becomes almost
like heroin,” says Ed Gotgart, president of the
Massachusetts Association of Nonprofit
Schools and Colleges. “You build your pro-
gram around the assumption that you can’t
survive without government money.”6 9
Ironically, given that many private charities
are dedicated to fighting dependence on wel-
fare, government funding may quickly make
the charities themselves dependent. Lobbying
for, securing, and retaining funding can quick-
ly become an organization’s top priority. As
the Salvation Army’s Triston says, “Most
everyone is fighting for every penny they can
get to run whatever program they have.”7 0
Already many of our largest charities
receive more money from the government
than from private donations and maintain
large professional lobbying organizations in
Washington. One newspaper described those
organizations as “transformed from charita-
ble groups run essentially on private dona-
tions into government vendors—big busi-
nesses wielding jobs and amassing clout to
further their own agendas.”7 1 Kimberly
Dennis, former executive director of the
Philanthropy Roundtable, notes that those
organizations are “more interested in
expanding government’s responsibilities
than in strengthening private institutions to
address social concerns.”72 In many ways they
have simply become another special interest
at the trough of federal largesse.
Surely we do not want to put charities on
the dole. There is no reason to believe that
welfare for charities would be any less
destructive than welfare for individuals.
In fact, one could wonder about the kind
of message such charities would be sending
to their clients. On the one hand, they would
be trying to teach people to be responsible
and independent, to find work rather than
welfare, to take care of themselves. But at the
same time those organizations would have
their own hands out asking for a form of wel-
fare. That seems as contradictory as an anti-
smoking group’s investing in tobacco stocks.
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Coercion and the Nature of
Charity
The whole idea of government charity is an
oxymoron. After all, the essence of private
charity is voluntarism: individuals helping
others because they love their neighbor. In
fact, in the Bible, the Greek word translated as
“charity” is agapeo, which means “love.”7 3 But
the essence of government is coercion, the use
of force to make people do things they would
not do voluntarily. As historian and social
commentator Gertrude Himmelfarb put it,
“Compassion is a moral sentiment, not a
political principle.”7 4This difference is as sim-
ple as the difference between my reaching into
my pocket to get money to help someone in
need and my reaching into your pocket for the
same purpose. The former is charity; the latter
is not.
True charity is ennobling of everyone
involved, both those who give and those who
receive. A government grant is ennobling of no
one. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that more
than 150 years ago when he called for the aboli-
tion of public relief, citing the fact that private
charity established a “moral tie” between giver
and receiver. That tie is destroyed when the
money comes from an impersonal government
grant. The donor (taxpayer) resents his involun-
tary contribution, and the recipient feels no real
gratitude for what he receives.7 5
Private charities may even find that fewer
people contribute voluntarily. If people come
to believe that government will provide fund-
ing, they may decide that there is less need for
their contributions. That will result in the loss
not only of money but of the human quality
of charity. As Robert Thompson of the
University of Pennsylvania noted a century
ago, using government money for charitable
purposes is a “rough contrivance to lift from
the social conscience a burden that should not
be either lifted or lightened in any way.”7 6
The end result will be the substitution of
coercive government tax financing for com-
passion-based voluntary giving. That will
mean the end of “charity” as we know it.
Conclusion
More than 20 years ago religious scholars
Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus argued
against government funding of faith-based
charities, warning that “the real danger is
that [faith-based organizations] might be co-
opted by government in a too eager embrace
that would destroy the very distinctiveness of
their function.”77
There is no reason to take that risk.
Private charity is thriving in America. We are
the most generous nation on earth. In 1999
Americans contributed to charity more than
$190 billion, more than $80 billion of which
was given to religious organizations. That
was an increase of more than $4 billion over
the previous year.7 8
In addition, more than half of all
American adults do volunteer work. That
time and effort are worth more than an addi-
tional $225 billion.7 9 And that does not
include the countless dollars and time given
to family members, neighbors, and others
outside the formal charity system.
President Bush’s proposal contains a
number of valuable ideas to make it even eas-
ier for Americans to build on this generous
record, including allowing taxpayers who do
not itemize to deduct their charitable contri-
butions. Some experts estimate that this
could encourage an additional $12 billion to
$15 billion in contributions each year.8 0
The few billion dollars per year that the
federal government could add to this mix
would be little more than drops in an ocean
of charitable giving. But with those few dol-
lars would come strings, regulations, and
serious questions about the separation of
church and state. Charities that accepted
government funds could find themselves
overwhelmed with paperwork and subject to
a host of federal regulations. As they became
increasingly dependent on government
money, those charities could find their mis-
sions shifting, their religious character lost,
the very things that made them so successful
destroyed. The whole idea of charity could
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become subtly corrupted, the difference
between the welfare state and true charity
blurred. That is a very high price to pay for a
handful of federal dollars.
The Bible warns that “the love of money is
the root of evil.” It is a lesson worth remem-
bering when we think about mixing govern-
ment with charity. President Bush should
abandon his proposal and leave charities to
do what they do best.
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